### 1AC

“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.”—Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach* (1845)

#### The abstract, liberal conception of free speech, the so-called “marketplace of ideas,” props up capitalist power relationships. Unequal access to power constrains rights, including that of free speech. Free speech is an inherent right that is essential to dignity, contrary to the consequentialist ethos

**Farber 17**

Samuel Farber (has been involved in left and socialist politics for well over fifty years). “A Socialist Approach to Free Speech.” Jacobin. February 27th, 2017. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/02/garton-ash-free-speech-milo-yiannopoulos/>

Mill’s On Liberty, in contrast, defends free expression primarily on the grounds that truth will emerge from the so-called free marketplace of ideas, making this supposition the principal argument for free speech. It is clear that the absence of free speech and political freedom stand in the way of the search for the truth. But our marketplace of ideas is oligopolistic and thus not fully free, constrained as it is in a class society. Should free speech, therefore, become less valued? Rather than relying on the promise of a consequentialist heaven, it can be argued that a right is a good thing in itself, essential to the dignity and self-determination of persons, and necessary for democracy. Rights — including the right to free speech — might help produce the closest approximation to truth and a better society, but, much more important, they are a constituent element of a good society. Like other conceptions of rights grounded on metaphysical, ahistoric notions like human nature or natural law, Garton Ash’s reliance on empathy and tolerance cannot found a robust right to free expression, safe from erosion by powerful economic or governmental actors. We need an alternative approach to rights that does not hinge on abstractions. Rosa Luxemburg offers one: Every right of suffrage, like any other political right, is not to be measured by some sort of abstract scheme of “justice,” or in terms of any other bourgeois-democratic phrases, but by the social and economic relationships for which it is designed. Luxemburg understands rights as embodiments of concrete social and economic relationships. In liberal capitalist societies, unequal access to power constrains these rights. In a thoroughly democratic socialist society, these constraints would disappear. Indeed, what Free Speech most lacks is Luxemburg’s concrete understanding of the relationship between rights and power. In what follows, I’ll detail three of the ten principles that organize the book to show how his liberal interpretation of the right to free speech fails to account for the impact of power structures on free speech.

#### Trigger warnings are established on campuses as a matter of policy. This normalizes a neoliberal view of higher education as a commodity. We must affirm free speech to recognize that education should make people uncomfortable in order to challenge oppression

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Of course, trigger warnings have been on campus for a very long time, but they haven’t always gone by that name. Students receive both formal and informal counseling about which courses to take and from whom. This advice partly depends on each student’s interests, views, and experiences. Required courses usually have different sections and instructors — who often vary from semester to semester — and instructors typically provide detailed syllabi that inform students in advance about the course materials. Further, certain courses constitute trigger warnings by their very nature, as, for example, courses on rape law. Finally, many instructors present additional warnings when they introduce specific assignments. To oblige instructors to do so as a matter of policy — as some students and faculty are arguing we should — establishes an unnecessary restriction on both the instructor’s and students’ freedom of speech. It encourages a climate of undue caution, timidity, and even fear in what should be a wide-ranging but mutually respectful exploration of ideas. The current call for universal trigger warnings may emerge from the doctrine of positive thinking that attempts to disguise the inevitable pain provoked by crises as opportunities to grow and develop. It certainly comes out of the neoliberal view of higher education as consumption in which tuition dollars are supposed to buy a pleasurable product. Instead, we should view education as a necessarily uncomfortable experience that challenges students’ certainties of class, race, and gender. Democratic education encourages respectful but sharp debate instead of obscuring the sordid nature of racism and exploitation with fashionable buzzwords. Along the same lines, colleges and universities trying to police microagressions not only curtail students’ freedom of expression but also rob them of important educational opportunities. In 2007, research psychologist Derald Wing Sue and his collaborators defined microaggressions as brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual-orientation, and religious slights and insults to the target person or group. That this behavior frequently occurs in institutions of higher learning should not surprise us. American society has a substantial reservoir of racism and sexism, and educational and residential segregation encourages insensitivity and unintentionally offensive behavior toward racial and gender minorities. University administrations should teach students, faculty, and staff to avoid such behavior. A few administrators, however, have gone past this and created highly specific codes of conduct to enforce a culture of tolerance on campus. Besides setting a bad precedent, their efforts to closely regulate behavior fosters an oppressive climate. In 2016, the Diversity Office and other groups at University of Massachusetts Amherst issued the “Simple Costume Racism Evaluator and Assessment Meter,” or SCREAM, a detailed checklist that helped students assess their costumes’ offensiveness across five threat levels. For example, students were asked if, when dressing up as another person, that person was of the student’s own race. If yes, the costume carried a “low” threat level. If no, the student was asked if the costume required heavy makeup. If no, the threat level rose to “guarded.” If yes, the threat levels increased to “elevated,” “high,” or “severe,” depending on how much makeup the costume required and if it was an attempt at humor targeting a person from a marginalized group. Rather than using Halloween to educate the community about how victims of sexist and racist oppression may find certain costumes offensive, the Diversity Office instead issued a mechanical and lengthy checklist to guide the behavior of the campus community from above. What is most disturbing about this top-down approach is the assumption that university (or government) administrators should be the principal source of corrective action in matters that do not involve individual or institutional discrimination. In the last analysis, university administrations will prioritize the institution’s peace and reputation over ensuring racial and gender justice. In the sixties and seventies, when female and minority students confronted worse forms of racism and sexism on campus, they resorted, with a substantial degree of success, to face-to-face confrontation. While not perfect — and certainly not popular among university authorities — this approach is far preferable to the regulations’ bureaucratic rigidity and absurdity. More importantly, it protects the free speech rights of instructors and students.

**Neoliberal rationality prioritizes profit at the expense of moral values—reject calculative theories**

**Brown 3**

Wendy Brown (Professor of Political Science at UC Berkley. Professor Brown received her Ph.D in Political Philosophy from Princeton University in 1983. Prior to coming to Berkeley in 1999, she taught at the University of California, Santa Cruz and at Williams College. Her work has been translated into more than twenty languages. She lectures around the world and has held a number of distinguished visiting fellowships and lectureships.  Most recently, she has been a member of the Birkbeck Critical Theory Summer School faculty (2012), a Senior Invited Fellow of the Center for Humanities at Cornell University (2013) and a visiting professor at Columbia University (2014)). “Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy.” Theory and Event 7:1. 2003. http://lchc.ucsd.edu/cogn\_150/Readings/brown.pdf

However, invaluable as Marx's theory of capital and Weber's theory of rationalization are in theorizing aspects of neo-liberalism, neither brings into view the historical-institutional rupture it signifies, the form of governmentality it replaces and the form it inaugurates, and hence, the modalities of resistance it outmodes and those that must be developed if it is to be effectively challenged. Neo-liberalism is not an inevitable historical development of capital and instrumental rationality; it is not the unfolding of laws of capital or of instrumental rationality suggested by a Marxist or Weberian analysis but represents instead a new and contingent organization and operation of both. Moreover, neither analysis articulates the shift neo-liberalism heralds from relatively differentiated moral, economic, and political rationalities and venues in liberal democratic orders to their discursive and practical integration. Neo-liberal governmentality undermines the relative autonomy of certain institutions from one another and from the market -- law, elections, the police, the public sphere -- an independence that formerly sustained an interval and a tension between a capitalist political economy and a liberal democratic political system. The implications of this transformation are significant. If Marcuse worried about the loss of a dialectical opposition within capitalism when it "delivers the goods," that is, when, by mid-twentieth century, a relatively complacent middle class had taken the place of the hard-laboring impoverished masses Marx depicted as the negating contradiction to the concentrated wealth of capital, neo-liberalism entails the erosion of oppositional political, moral, or subjective claims located outside capitalist rationality but inside liberal democratic society, that is, the erosion of institutions, venues, and values organized by non-market rationalities in democracies. When democratic principles of governance, civil codes, and even religious morality are submitted to economic calculation, when no value or good stands outside of this calculus, sources of opposition to, and mere modulation of, capitalist rationality disappear. This reminds us that however much a Left analysis has identified a liberal political order with legitimating, cloaking, and mystifying the stratifications of society achieved by capitalism and achieved as well by racial, sexual, and gender superordinations, it is also the case that liberal democratic principles of governance -- liberalism as a political doctrine -- have functioned as something of an antagonism to these stratifications. As Marx himself argued in "On the Jewish Question," formal political principles of equality and freedom (with their attendant promises of individual autonomy and dignity) figure an alternative vision of humanity and alternative social and moral referents to those of the capitalist order within which they are asserted. This is the Janus-face or at least Janus-potential of liberal democracy vis a vis a capitalist economy: while liberal democracy encodes, reflects, and legitimates capitalist social relations, it simultaneously resists, counters, and tempers them. Put simply, what liberal democracy has provided over the last two centuries is a modest ethical gap between economy and polity. Even as liberal democracy converges with many capitalist values (property rights, individualism, Hobbesian assumptions underneath all contract, etc.) the formal distinction it establishes between moral and political principles on the one hand and the economic order on the other has also served as insulation against the ghastliness of life exhaustively ordered by the market and measured by market values. It is this gap that a neo-liberal political rationality closes as it submits every aspect of political and social life to economic calculation: asking not, for example, what does liberal constitutionalism stand for, what moral or political values does it protect and preserve, but rather what efficacy or profitability does constitutionalism promote . . . .or interdict? Liberal democracy cannot be submitted to neo-liberal political governmentality and survive. There is nothing in liberal democracy's basic institutions or values -- from free elections, representative democracy, and individual liberties equally distributed, to modest power-sharing or even more substantive political participation -- that inherently meets the test of serving economic competitiveness or inherently withstands a cost-benefit analysis. And it is liberal democracy that is going under in the present moment, even as the flag of American "democracy" is being planted everywhere it finds or creates soft ground. (The fact that "democracy" is the rubric under which so much anti-democratic imperial and domestic policy is enacted suggests that we are in an inter-regnum, or more precisely, that neo-liberalism borrows extensively from the old regime to legitimate itself even as it also develops and disseminates new codes of legitimacy. More about this below.)

#### I affirm the resolution as a site of praxis for free speech from below.

#### This method is essential to working-class revolution

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Free Speech From Below When grappling with the question of free speech, socialists should look not to Isaiah Berlin, the model of courage in defense of free speech evoked by Garton Ash, but to Rosa Luxemburg, who insisted that free expression was designed for those who disagree. The view presented here differs not only from liberalism but also from left currents that adhere to authoritarian-from-above visions of socialism. Among these are the longstanding notions explicitly or implicitly advocating for an “educational dictatorship” of enlightened intellectuals, as found in Herbert Marcuse’s work. In A Critique of Pure Tolerance, he argues that we should suppress the powerful’s right to free speech because they aim to brainwash the minds of the people. His argument rests on the implicit claim that intellectuals like him should decide what ideas the people should be exposed to. Like Garton Ash, Marcuse bases his analysis of free speech on tolerance and similarly cannot produce a solid defense of the right to free expression. This seems ironic since Marcuse and those who agreed with him were a small minority — their ideas were more likely to be suppressed than the rulers’. Luxemburg’s position also differs from Stalinist and neo-Stalinist politics in all its expressions, which wrongly maintain that Marx was not interested in defending “bourgeois” individual rights and political democracy. In fact, Marx’s politics were deeply rooted in his time’s radical democratic movements. In his first article, he sharply criticizes the government decree that established censorship, arguing: The writer is thus subjected to the most frightful terrorism, the jurisdiction of suspicion. Laws about tendency, laws that do not provide objective norms, are laws of terrorism, such as were conceived by the state’s exigencies under Robespierre and the state’s rottenness under the Roman emperors. For some left currents, free speech and other democratic freedoms serve as an ideological cover for the bourgeoisie’s defense of private property. In fact, the capitalist bourgeoisie has never been deeply committed to free speech and other civil liberties, happily coexisting with a wide variety of antidemocratic political regimes, South African apartheid and fascism included. In the last analysis, private ownership of the means of production allows capitalists to maintain social and economic power independent of the political system. Indeed, breaking the ruling class control over socioeconomic power and establishing collective ownership depends on democracy: “the first step in the revolution by the working class,” proclaimed The Communist Manifesto, “is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.” For the most part, struggles for democratic rights — such as free speech, the abolition of slavery, universal suffrage, workers’, and women’s rights — came after the bourgeois revolution. They were democratic conquests won through popular struggle. Free speech, free association, and other democratic freedoms allowed workers to fight for their interests. Some proponents of socialism from above tend to defend democratic freedoms only for the working class, but this perspective has a narrow and parochial view of a class that should be, as Lenin argued, “the tribune of the people,” the representative of the interests of the great social majority, and runs contrary to the socialist tradition’s strong emphasis on demanding universal political rights such as suffrage. In a more cynical vein, this political current has demanded free speech and other democratic rights only when they belong to the persecuted opposition. In contrast to this view, as Hal Draper argued in his 1968 article “Free Speech and Political Struggle”: “There can be no contradiction, no gulf in principle between what is demanded of the existing state, and what we propose for the society we want to replace it, a free society.” Consistent with this approach, we must defend free speech on its own terms, not merely because it helps to organize and fight for a new society. In this, free speech does not differ from the economic advances the working class and its allies have won. They are valuable both in their own right and because they strengthen the working class and its allies in their struggle for their emancipation.

#### The violence of capitalism is foundational to slavery and anti-blackness—racist inequalities cannot be understood outside of political economy

**Taylor 16**

Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor (assistant professor in Princeton University’s Center for African American Studies). “What About Racism?” Jacobin. March 16th, 2016. <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2016/03/black-lives-matter-slavery-discrimination-socialism/>

For more than a year, the Black Lives Matter movement has gripped the United States. The movement’s central slogan is a simple, declarative recognition of black humanity in a society that is wracked by economic and social inequality disproportionately experienced by African Americans. The movement is relatively new, but the racism that spawned it is not. By every barometer in American society — health care, education, employment, poverty — African Americans are worse off. Elected officials from across the political spectrum often blame these disparities on an absence of “personal responsibility” or view them as a cultural phenomenon particular to African Americans. In reality, racial inequality has been largely produced by government policy and private institutions that not only impoverish African Americans but also demonize and criminalize them. Yet racism is not simply a product of errant public policy or even the individual attitudes of racist white people — and understanding the roots of racism in American society is critical for eradicating it. Crafting better public policy and banning discriminatory behavior by individuals or institutions won’t do the job. And while there is a serious need for government action barring practices that harm entire groups of people, these strategies fail to grasp the scale and depth of racial inequality in the United States. To understand why the United States seems so resistant to racial equality, we have to look beyond the actions of elected officials or even those who prosper from racial discrimination in the private sector. We have to look at the way American society is organized under capitalism. The Basic Division Capitalism is an economic system based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because of the gross inequality it produces, capitalism relies on various political, social, and ideological tools to rationalize that inequality while simultaneously dividing the majority, who have every interest in uniting to resist it. How does the one percent maintain its disproportionate control of the wealth and resources in American society? By a process of divide and rule. Racism is only one among many oppressions intended to serve this purpose. For example, American racism developed as a justification for the enslavement of Africans at a time when the world was celebrating the concepts of liberty, freedom, and self-determination. The dehumanization and subjection of black people had to be rationalized in this moment of new political possibilities. But the central objective was preserving the institution of slavery and the enormous riches that it produced. As Marx recognized: Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Marx also identified the centrality of African slave labor to the genesis of capitalism when he wrote that the discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of Black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. The labor needs of capital alone could explain how racism functioned under capitalism. The literal dehumanization of Africans for the sake of labor was used to justify their harsh treatment and their debased status in the United States. This dehumanization did not simply end when slavery was abolished; instead, the mark of inferiority branded onto black skin carried over into Emancipation and laid the basis for the second-class citizenship African Americans experienced for close to a hundred years after slavery. The debasement of blacks also made African Americans more vulnerable to economic coercion and manipulation — not just “anti-blackness.” Coercion and manipulation were rooted in the evolving economic demands of capital, but their impact rippled far beyond the economic realm. Black people were stripped of their right to vote, subjected to wanton violence, and locked into menial and poorly paid labor. This was the political economy of American racism. There was another consequence of racism and the marking of blacks. African Americans were so thoroughly banished from political, civil, and social life that it was virtually impossible for the vast majority of poor and working-class whites to even conceive of uniting with blacks to challenge the rule and authority of the ruling white clique. Marx recognized this basic division within the working class when he observed, “In the United States of America, every independent movement of the workers was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the Black it is branded.” Marx grasped the modern dynamics of racism as the means by which workers who had common objective interests could also become mortal enemies because of subjective — but nevertheless real — racist and nationalist ideas. Looking at the tensions between Irish and English workers, Marx wrote: Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it. For socialists in the United States, recognizing the centrality of racism in dividing the class that has the actual power to undo capitalism has typically meant that socialists have been heavily involved in campaigns and social movements to end racism. But within the socialist tradition, many have also argued that because African Americans and most other nonwhites are disproportionately poor and working class, campaigns aimed at ending economic inequality alone would stop their oppression. This stance ignores how racism constitutes its own basis for oppression for nonwhite people. Ordinary blacks and other nonwhite minorities are oppressed not only because of their poverty, but also because of their racial or ethnic identities. There is also no direct correlation between economic expansion or improved economic conditions and a decrease in racial inequality. In reality, racial discrimination often prevents African Americans and others from fully accessing the fruits of economic expansion. After all, the black insurgency of the 1960s coincided with the robust and thriving economy of the 1960s — black people were rebelling because they were locked out of American affluence. Looking at racism as only a byproduct of economic inequality ignores the ways that racism exists as an independent force that wreaks havoc in the lives of all African Americans. The struggle against racism regularly intersects with struggles for economic equality, but racism does not only express itself over economic questions. Antiracist struggles also take place in response to the social crises black communities experience, including struggles against racial profiling, police brutality, housing, health care, educational inequality, and mass incarceration and other aspects of the “criminal justice” system. These fights against racial inequality are critical, both for improving the lives of African Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities in the here-and-now; and for demonstrating to ordinary white people the destructive impact of racism in the lives of nonwhite people.

#### The role of the ballot and judge is to facilitate revolutionary critical pedagogy—this necessitates recognizing (1) that theorizing can’t be separated from class conflict, (2) that the ultimate goal of philosophy is emancipation, and (3) that the working-class is the revolutionary agent of change

**McLaren 15**

Peter McLaren (internationally renowned activist and teacher, and one of the founders of critical pedagogy). “Revolutionary Critical Pedagogy and the Struggle against Capital Today: An Interview with Peter McLaren.” Interview by Derek Ford, The Hampton Institute. June 16th, 2015. <http://www.hamptoninstitution.org/peter-mclaren-interview.html#.WLtiNW8rLBU>

Ford : Yes, that phrasing certainly emphasizes more appropriately the structural nature of this manifestation of the class struggle. McLaren : So, in education there are three fundamental approaches in philosophical reasoning: essentialism, perennialism, and progressivism, and the focus today among the educational left is mainly on progressivism-romantic progressives and pragmatic progressives (to use terms developed by Richard Quantz), and in my observations over the years, Marxism usually comes into the picture during discussions of the various political-economic ideologies within the progressive coalition. It is therefore important for me to address the following question to students of education: To what extent do these progressive thinkers believe their work rises above the reigning class antagonisms of transnational austerity capitalism? Most students likely believe that the theories that they study are relatively free of class determinations, and that should be a signal to us as critical educators, a warning about how and why certain theories have made their way into the official curriculum. For me, the immediate challenge is to locate theoretical and philosophical work politically within a larger vision or project of emancipation. Ideas-which under certain conditions can certainly exert a material force-are always situated in particular settings. These settings are always conditioned by the ideological and political superstructure, the historical conjuncture in which they were produced and in which they are now studied, and the economic and social structure. We need to understand how possibilities unleashed by the theories we study can be transformed into necessities and for that to happen we need to examine our present conjuncture dialectically, because social conditions and ideologies reciprocally inform each other; they are entangled and to a large extent mutually constitutive, and clearly they are never static or eternal. That being the case, we need to ask ourselves: What are the objective possibilities at this certain historical moment for socialism to become a viable possibility? As a socialist educator, that becomes the fundamental question. That means helping our students navigate beyond false dualisms and abstractions, between thought and action, theory and practice and it is here that a Marxist dialectic becomes important, especially the concept of praxis. One of the primary goals could be put thusly: How can we help the working-class become conscious of itself and its universal role in a permanent revolution? The really important consideration here is what standpoint we take when we move from merely interpreting the world to changing it, when we move from the indicative to the imperative. All of this, of course, is fueled by commitment and commitment relies on being able to assume the standpoint of the oppressed, the subaltern. Do we educate our teachers by discussing authors that place themselves in the class perspectives of the proletariat, the cognitariat, or the precariat? Paulo Freire, Howard Zinn, Frantz Fanon and Che Guevara all do. But does that mean we only read working-class authors or authors sympathetic to the working-class? Of course not. But we need to teach students to consider how an author's own class positionality influences his or her work. Over time, and during years of deliberation, I came to understand postmodern thought and reformist liberalism embedded in the work of some critical theorists such as Habermas and in the work of John Dewey as insufficient for challenging the behemoth of transnational capitalism. Rousseau's voluptuous protest was against the vile and iniquitous social institutions dominated by capitalists. He wagered that if the social contradictions stemming from these institutions could be abolished or severely attenuated, then there would be greater possibility for liberty and sovereignty. Yet as Istvan Meszaros pointed out, Rousseau could not abstain from idealizing the very conditions against which he provided alternatives since it was clear that the contradictions that he condemned were integrated within the objective conditions of capitalist society itself. After all, Rousseau considered private property to be one of the ultimate foundations of civilized life. Many well-intentioned theorists idealize the very conditions of alienation and atomization that they rail against, affirming what they originally intended to negate and they do this by employing abstract moral ideals to challenge what are essentially economic systems of exploitation and thus fail to mediate their ideas to the material base of society (i.e., the social relations of production as well as determinate human relations). The only way out of this impasse in which one interest is set up against another in permanent struggle is through a dialectical materialist analysis. We see a similar predicament in the later Marcuse when he became more interested in the development of Hegel's ontology than his dialectics, which forced him into an aesthetic ontology marked by an antinomial (neo-Kantian) cul-de-sac in which his critique vacillated between poles regarded as independent rather than internally related, preventing Marcuse from forging a path forward to transformation. While Marcuse's earlier Great Refusal was rooted in the Hegelian notion of negativity where a positive is constituted as the old is being negated, Marcuse tended at times to separate the normative and the descriptive, thus remaining in the thrall of the Kantian ought or an indeterminate rather than a determinate negation, lacking in the final instance the concrete emancipatory universals of Marx. This, of course, relates to Dunayevskaya's critique of Marcuse, when she accuses Marcuse of viewing Hegel's Absolute Idea as a closed totality when Dunayevskaya saw it as containing the highest opposition within itself, a dialectic of negativity that served as the lifeblood of transcendence, a place of self-movement where contradictions cannot be adventitiously dismissed or harmlessly reconciled or cancelled. For Dunayevskaya, absolute negativity constituted important new beginnings for revolutionary thought. But this is not to dismiss the important work of Marcuse. As Charles Reitz points out, Marcuse's work importantly contributed to a philosophy of labor, which recognizes labor's central and transformative role in human life. The point I am trying to make is that even within the field of critical pedagogy there is a studied reluctance when it comes to confronting the transformation of surplus labor into private capital. Again, we come back to my earlier question: What do educational theorists represent by their ideas? This is no small matter at a time when we are witnessing the gargantuan rise of transnational state apparatuses, interlocked networks of nation states and supranational and transnational institutions that fuels the new global ruling class, a class that is intent on superceding national accumulation. Or, as William I. Robinson points out, at a time of capitalist restructuring, reorganization and refurbishing, producing a new transnational class based on deregulation, informalization, deunionization and the flexibility of labor, creating vast armies of precariats and new strategies by the transnational elites to contain real and potential rebellion by the immiserated masses. Ford : And so it is the two irretrievably connected questions of how we understand and combat this new transnational capitalist class, yes? McLaren : Right, and right now colleges of education courses that attempt to be radical usually follow through with hefty doses of Foucault, Holloway, Deleuze, Hardt, Negri and Said. Such foundation courses in schools of education tend to focus on autonomous Marxism, post-colonialism, and the strategic importance of the self-limiting revolution. Taken together, this constitutes a rejection of Marxism and revolution and the affirmation of a position that supports labor reform but does not advocate overthrowing state power. Here, the utopian horizon of Marxism is often conflated with repression, something that is likely to lead to the gulag. Kevin Anderson and Peter Hudis have written about this and I am in agreement with them. There is a serious problem with Foucault's rejection of the Marxist conception of false consciousness in favor of a view in which power is productive and enabling rather than repressive; power is something that, according to Foucault, produces alternative realities. Marx's humanism is held in suspect as Promethean within which a colonial hubris is embedded. With Foucault there exists no main locus of power that must be challenged, and therefore no concept of liberation or emancipation is possible, only the more truncated possibility of challenging power as forms of micro-resistance. Kevin Anderson maintains that a similar position is reflected in Hardt and Negri's politics of difference where global struggles are viewed as incommensurable to the extent that they can only be challenged in terms of localized bio-power absent of any unified philosophy or organization. Anderson notes that Hart and Negri posit a one-sided alternative by choosing to remain on the plane of immanence or within the given social reality as a point of resistance, preferring to take their inspiration from a pre-Hegelian world cut off from the dialectic and thereby sidelining the positive contained within the negative. While I may agree that the working-class is immanent to capital, I also maintain that it can also become a force for transcendence, as the future is always contained in the present. This does not mean that I reduce everything to proletarian class struggle. Marxist humanists vigorously embrace struggles around race, disability, gender and sexuality but they do so within a revolutionary praxis that is capable of overcoming capitalism and building a social universe outside of the value form of labor. I have faith that people can overcome capitalism through their own emancipatory praxis, as people change society and change their own consciousness at the same time.

### 1AR Hate Speech DA

#### Safe spaces discourage critical thinking of oppressive institutions

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Now, some campus voices have starting calling for the establishment of safe spaces beyond specific locations where groups can meet by themselves, demanding that the classroom and even the entire campus become safe spaces for historically oppressed groups. This would be a perversion of the right of free association and assembly, directly blocking higher education’s ability to challenge established ideologies and practices as a way to encourage critical thinking. While hate speech is unacceptable inside the classroom because it creates a hostile learning environment, this should not be confused with the introduction of ideas that some may find alien and even offensive, which is essential to higher education.